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STANDSTILL AGREEMENTS: ENTERRA VALIDATES
THE USE OF STANDSTILL AGREEMENTS
TO GOVERN MINORITY
INVESTMENT PROGRAMS
The proliferation of corporate takeover activity in recent years' has
spurred an increase in the use of standstill agreements to avert corporate
control battles.2 Standstill agreements are voluntarily negotiated contracts
between corporate management and a substantial shareholder which prohibit
the shareholder from acquiring more than a specified number of shares in
the corporation. 3 The most common function of a standstill agreement is to
define the terms of an investor's acquisition of a minority interest in an
issuing corporation. 4 Standstill agreements currently govern minority invest-
1. See I M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS & FREEZEOUTS § 1.01 at 1-3 (1984)
(brief overview of increase in corporate takeover activity in recent years). See generally Toy,
The Raiders, Bus. WK., March 4, 1985, at 80 (informative discussion of corporate takeover
phenomenon, highlighting individuals instrumental in effecting recent major corporate takeo-
vers).
2. See Memorandum Regarding Standstill Agreements: Checklist of Key Issues, reprinted
in 2 M. IPTON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS & FREEZEOUTS A-43 (1984) (companies increas-
ingly have acquired minority positions in target companies and then agreed to execute standstill
agreements) [hereinafter cited as Standstill Agreement Memorandum].
3. See Bialkin, The Use of Standstill Agreements in Corporate Transactions, in PLI,
THIRTEENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 91, 93, 96 (A. Fleischer & M.
Lipton eds. 1981) (PLI Corporate Law & Practice Handbook Series No. 373) (defining standstill
agreement); Fleischer & Sternberg, Corporate Acquisitions, 12 REV. SEc. REG. 937 (1979) (under
standstill agreement investor agrees to maintain its position in target corporation for specific
period and subject to certain conditions). The parties to standstill agreements usually are
corporate entities. Bartlett & Andrews, The Standstill Agreement: Legal and Business Consid-
erations Underlying a Corporate Peace Treaty, 62 B.U. L. REV. 143 n.2 (1982); see infra note
5 (listing examples of standstill agreements between corporate entities).
4. See Bartlett & Andrews, supra note 3, at 144 n.5. The generic term for a corporate
investor's acquisition of a significant minority investment in an issuing corporation is a "minority
investment program." Nathan, Corporate Stock Repurchases And Stock Issuances In the
Context of Unsolicited Takeover Bids, in PLI ELEVENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES
REGULATION 299, 342 (A. Fleischer & M. Lipton eds. 1981) (PLI Corporate Law & Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 373). An investor may acquire a minority position in an issuing
corporation through direct purchases from the issuer, through negotiated purchases with a third
party, or through an accumulation of the issuer's stock on the open market. See id. at 343; see
also I A. FLEISCHER, TENDER OFFERS: DEFENSES, RESPONSES, AND PLANNING 112-13 (1984). An
investor may accumulate the issuing corporation's shares through negotiated purchases or on
the open market as a means of securing a passive investment situation or as a first step toward
the acquisition of the issuer. See Nathan, supra, at 393, 366; FLEISCHER, supra, at 112-15.
Typically, corporate management will be alerted to a single investor's significant accumulation
of shares when the investor sends management and the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) a Schedule 13D. FLEISCRER, supra, at 116 n.38; see 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (Supp. V 1981)
(Securities Exchange Act of 1934). Section 13d-l(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
requires any person or group acquiring more than 5% of any class of registered equity security
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ment programs in several prominent, publicly held corporations.' As an
instrument governing a minority investment program, a standstill agreement
permits an investor to acquire a significant number of shares in the issuing
corporation up to a specified limit without interference from corporate
management while providing management assurance that an investor's mi-
to file a Schedule 13D with the issuer and the SEC within 10 days after reaching the 507o
threshold. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1). A Schedule 13D filed pursuant to § 13d-1 must disclose
among other things the identity and background of the investor, the source of funds used to
acquire the stock, and the purpose of the acquisition. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(I)(A),(B),(C).
In response to an investor's significant accumulation of an issuing corporation's stock, the
issuing corporation and the investor may negotiate on amicable terms a standstill agreement to
define the terms of a "friendly" minority investment program. See FLEISCHER, supra, at 116-
18; see also infra notes 49-54 and accompanying text (discussing facts of Enterra Corp. v. SGS
Associates giving rise to standstill agreement governing friendly minority investment program).
Alternatively, the parties may execute a standstill agreement as a means of settling a dispute
between the issuing corporation and the investor which has arisen as a result of the investor's
significant accumulation of the issuer's stock. See FLEISCHER, supra, at 144-45. If litigation
commenced by one or both of the parties is pending as a result of the dispute, the execution of
a standstill agreement may serve as part of a resolution to the litigation in order to avoid
additional litigation costs. See Bialkin, supra note 3, at 102-04. A standstill agreement executed
as part of a resolution to litigation often is accompanied by a repurchase agreement in which
the investor agrees to repurchase at a premium all or part of the issuer's stock acquired by the
investor. See id.; FLEIscItER, supra, at 144-45; Agreement between Cities Service Co. and Mesa
Petroleum Co. (June 18, 1982) (under terms of repurchase/standstill agreement Cities bought
back stock while Mesa agreed not to buy Cities stock for stated period and both parties agreed
to dismiss pending litigation), reprinted in LIPTON & STEINBEROER, supra note 2, at A-76, A-
77. Finally, the parties to a standstill agreement governing a minority investment program may
have executed the agreement in connection with the issuing corporation's planned solicitation
of the investor to act as a "white knight." See LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 1, at §
6.06[4]; Bialkin, supra note 3, at 96. A standstill agreement arising in the context of a white
knight arrangement often is the product of an issuing corporation's direct sale to an investor
of a significant block of the corporation's stock in order to deter unsolicited third party
acquisition bids. See LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 1, at § 6.06[4]; Nathan, supra, at 363-
65. Like a standstill agreement resulting from a purely investment situation, a standstill
agreement that is the product of a white knight arrangement restricts the investor to a minority
position in the issuing corporation and defines the terms of the relationship between the investor
and the issuer. See Bialkin, supra note 3, at 96.
5. See, e.g., Whittaker Corporation-Smith International Inc. Agreement (Jan. 20, 1983)
(Exhibit I to Schedule 13D (amend. 3), filed with SEC by Whittaker Corp. on January 27,
1983) (on file at Washington & Lee Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Whittaker-Smith
Agreement]; Martin Marietta Corporation-Allied Corporation Standstill Agreement (Sept. 24,
1982), reprinted in PLI, HOSTILE BATTLES FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 769, 784 (D. Block & H.
Pitt eds. 1984) (PLI Corporate Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 440) [hereinafter
cited as Martin Marietta-Allied Agreement]; Seagram Company, Ltd.-E.I. Du Pont de
Nemours and Company Agreement (Oct. 2, 1981) (Exhibit C to Schedule 13D (amend. 3), filed
with SEC by E.I. Du Pont de Nemours and Company on Oct. 7, 1981), reprinted in 2 LIPTON
& STEINBERGER, supra note 2, at A-79 [hereinafter cited as Seagram-Du Pont Agreement];
Scott Paper Company-Brascan Limited Agreement (Mar. 21, 1981) (Exhibit A to Schedule
13D (amend. 2), filed with SEC by Brascan Limited on March 27, 1981); City Investing
Company-NVF Company Letter Agreement (Aug. 1, 1980) (Exhibit 2 to Schedule 13D (amend.




nority investment will not operate as a toe-hold for an unsolicited takeover
bid. 6 Standstill agreements thus promote peace and stability in the relation-
ship between a major investor and the issuing corporation.
7
Although the scope and provisions of various standstill agreements differ,
a standstill agreement governing a minority investment program typically
contains certain characteristic provisions which reflect the divergent interests
of the investor and the issuing corporation. 8 From an issuing corporation's
point of view, the essential covenant embodied in a standstill agreement is a
provision restricting the investor from acquiring shares beyond a negotiated
6. See Bartlett & Andrews, supra note 3, at 145-46. Corporate entities may use standstill
agreements for purposes other than to govern a minority investment program. See Bialkin,
supra note 3, at 93 (listing various uses of standstill agreements). In connection with a
confidentiality agreement which facilitates the exchange of information in order for companies
to evaluate each other, the parties may enter into a standstill agreement to freeze their relative
stock positions while the companies exchange information under the confidentiality agreement.
See General Portland, Inc. v. LaFarge Coppee S.A., [1982-83 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 99,148 at 95,540 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 1981) (recognizing validity of standstill
agreement used in connection with confidentiality agreement); General Portland Inc.-La Farge
Letter Agreement (Feb. 5, 1981), reprinted in Thirteenth Annual Institute On Securities
Regulation, supra note 3, at 119 (parties agree to exchange evaluation material for purposes of
considering possible combination of companies). Corporations also have executed standstill
agreements to facilitate an exchange offer pursuant to a merger agreement. See Crouse-Hinds
Co. v. Internorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 695 (2d Cir. 1980); Bialkin, supra note 3, at 93, 99-102.
Under the exchange offer, the target company and the acquiring party agree to exchange shares
of common stock as the first step in a two-step merger transaction. See Crouse-Hinds Co., 634
F.2d at 695; Bialkin, supra note 1, at 99. The standstill provision of the exchange agreement,
which places restrictions on the use and disposition of the newly acquired shares, prevents either
party to the agreement from acquiring an entire equity interest in the other party in the event
that the second step of the merger does not take place. See Crouse-Hinds Co., 634 F.2d at 695;
Bialkin, supra note 3, at 99; Crouse-Hinds Company-Beldin Corporation Agreement (Sept.
23, 1980), reprinted in PLI, Thirteenth Annual Institute on Security Regulation, supra note 3,
at 123 (Exchange Offer Agreement).
7. See Bartlett & Andrews, supra note 3, at 144 (standstill agreement essentially is
corporate peace treaty).
8. See id. at 151 (standstill agreements typically contain distinctive provisions); Nathan,
supra note 4, at 354. One commentator lists four basic provisions parties commonly include in
standstill agreements governing minority investment programs. See Nathan, supra note 4, at
354. These four provisions typically govern the limitations on the investor's acquisition of
additional shares, restrictions imposed on the investor's ability to transfer or dispose of the
issuer's shares, the degree of participation in management afforded the investor, and the
registration rights granted the investor. Nathan, supra note 4, at 354; see FLEISCHER, supra note
4, at 146-48 (listing provisions typically contained in standstill agreements resulting from creeping
acquisitions); infra notes 9-37 and accompanying text (discussing various provisions commonly
found in standstill agreements).
Beyond a common desire for peaceful coexistence during the term of the standstill
agreement, the parties to a standstill agreement have differing objectives. Bartlett & Andrews,
supra note 3, at 145. Compare infra notes 9-13 and accompanying text (stock acquisition
limitation provision serves management's objective of averting control battle and infra notes
14-17 and accompanying text (right of first refusal provision provides management assurance
that stock will not fall into hands of unfriendly third party) with infra notes 27-29 and
accompanying text (registration rights promote investor's access to public trading market to
dispose of issuer's stock).
1985] 1017
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW
limit.9 This stock ownership limitation provision commonly provides that the
investor will not acquire more than a specified percentage of the corporation's
outstanding shares for a stipulated number of years.' 0 In permitting an
investor to acquire a significant, although limited amount of an issuing
corporation's outstanding shares, the ownership limitation provision of a
standstill agreement may facilitate the issuer's objective of avoiding a control
battle in one of two ways depending upon whom the issuer views as a
potential acquiror.1' When the issuer's concern is that the investor may
attempt a takeover, the limitation provision serves the issuer's objective of
retaining control by preventing the investor from gaining working control of
the issuing corporation through further acquisitions of the issuer's stock.2
9. See FLEISCHER, supra note 4, at 374 (key provision in every standstill agreement is
restriction on purchase of additional shares by investor); Nathan, supra note 4, at 354 (under
standstill agreement issuer invariably will limit investor's holdings); Fleischer & Sternberg, supra
note 3, at 938 (every standstill agreement restricts investor's purchases of issuer's stock).
10. See, e.g., Martin Marietta-Allied Agreement, supra note 5, at 771 (20.9%0 stock
ownership limitation, 10 year term); Seagram-DuPont Agreement, supra note 5, at A-80 (25%
limitation, 10 year term); City Investing-NVF Agreement, supra note 5, at 4-5 (21% limitation,
5 year term). To prevent the investor from circumventing the acquisition limitation provision
of the standstill agreement, the issuing corporation should define broadly in the limitation
provision the term "investor" to include any person or entity associated with the investor. See
Bartlett & Andrews, supra note 3, at 152-53 (defining investor broadly prevents investor from
evading ownership limitation through related-entity purchases); City Investing-NVF Agreement,
supra note 5, at I (defining purchaser (investor) to include NVF and its affiliates and other
entities under NVF's control or acting on behalf or in concert with NVF). In addition, the
acquisition limitation provision should include a definition of the types of securities subject to
the limitation provision. See Bartlett & Andrews, supra note 3, at 153 (issuer will seek
comprehensive definition of security while investor will seek limited definition); Standstill
Agreement Memorandum, supra 2, at A-45 (definition of voting securities should include
common stock and any other security possessing voting rights).
In addition to defining investor and security, the ownership limitation provision should
provide an adjustment mechanism to maintain the investor's relative investment position in
response to increases and decreases in the issuer's outstanding shares. See Bartlett & Andrews,
supra note 3, at 154-55 (discussing "ratchet" provisions which permit investor to retain holdings
in excess of limitation figure when reduction in number of issuer's outstanding shares occur,
and "antidilution" provisions which enable investor to compensate for increases in issuer's
outstanding shares); Nathan, supra note 4, at 356 (discussing provisions in standstill agreements
which anticipate increases in number of outstanding shares of issuer). The acquisition limitation
provision also may provide for termination of the agreement upon the occurrence of certain
events. See Bartlett & Andrews, supra note 3, at 154-56; see also infra notes 36-38 and
accompanying text (discussing termination provision of standstill agreements).
11. See Bartlett & Andrews, supra note 3, at 146 (discussing issuer's dual objectives in
executing standstill agreement); infra notes 12 & 13 and accompanying text (recognizing means
by which limitation provision facilitates issuer's objective of retaining control).
12. See Bartlett & Andrews, supra note 3, at 146 (in executing standstill agreement, issuer
may wish to avoid control battle with contracting investor). A standstill agreement that an
issuing corporation executes out of a concern that an investor may attempt a takeover, often is
the product of the corporation's response to an investor's significant accumulation of the
issuer's stock. See FLEISCHER, supra note 4, at 116-18 (management may execute standstill
agreement to oppose investor's creeping accumulation).
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Alternatively, the limitation provision indirectly may serve the issuer's desire
to discourage control battles with third party bidders by enabling the issuer
to place a substantial block of stock with an investor without fear of
takeover. 3
To retain the strategic position which the limitation provision of standstill
agreement may afford, corporate management normally seeks to incorporate
provisions into a standstill agreement which restrain the investor from freely
transferring or disposing of acquired shares. ' 4 Right of first refusal provisions
constitute the preeminent means by which corporate management prevents
the investor from transferring a significant number of shares into the hands
of an unfriendly third party.' 5 Typically, the right of first refusal provision
calls for the investor to notify the issuer before disposing of holdings, thereby
affording the issuer an opportunity to repurchase some or all of the shares
within a specified time period.' 6 Providing the issuer the option to repurchase
13. See Bartlett & Andrews, supra note 3, at 146 (issuer may execute standstill agreement
in connection with white knight arrangement). In placing a block of stock with an investor to
deter unwanted takeover bids, the issuer solicits the investor to act as a white knight. See
LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 1, § 6.06[41 at 105 (issuer may place block of stock with
investor and then enter into standstill agreement with investor); see also FLEISCHER, supra note
4, at 372-73 (placement of shares into friendly hands may be accompanied by standstill
agreement); supra note 4 (discussing standstill agreements arising in context of white knight
arrangement).
14. See Standstill Agreement Memorandum, supra note 2, at A-48, A-49; see, e.g.,
Whittaker Corporation-Smith Agreement, supra note 5, at 6 (containing transfer restriction
provision); Martin Marietta-Allied Standstill Agreement, supra note 5 at 771-78 (providing
provision for restrictions on resale or other dispositions of Martin Marietta stock); City Investing
Company-NVF Company Letter Agreement, supra note 5, at 1-2 (prohibiting NVF, investor,
from selling, transferring, or otherwise disposing of City Investing stock subject to listed
exceptions). Commentators have noted that transfer restriction provisions in standstill agree-
ments present potential drafting problems since severely restrictive transfer provisions may be
deemed an unreasonable restraint on the alienation of the issuer's shares. See Bartlett &
Andrews, supra note 3, at 157; Note, The Standstill Agreement: A Case Of Illegal Vote Selling
and a Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 93 YALE L. J. 1093, 1094 n.8 (1984). Several state courts have
suggested that although a reasonable restriction on the transfer of stock may be enforceable,
an absolute prohibition on the transfer of stock is against public policy and therefore unen-
forceable. See, e.g., Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 534, 542, 141 N.E.2d 812, 816,
161 N.Y.S.2d 418, 423 (1957) (effective prohibition on transfer of stock is impermissible whereas
mere restriction on transfer is permissible under law); Tracey v. Franklin, 31 Del. Ch. 447, 486-
87, 67 A.2d 56, 59-60 (1949) (court may relax public policy against restraint on alienation of
stock if recognizable proper purpose exists for such restraint); Greene v. E.H. Rollins & Sons,
Inc., 22 Del. Ch. 394, 403-04, 2 A.2d 249, 253-54 (1938) (provision in corporate charter
providing for compulsory sale to corporation upon demand and to exclusion of all others was
unlawful because unreasonable and contrary to public policy).
15. See Bartlett & Andrews, supra note 3, at 159-60; Nathan, supra note 4, at 360
(discussing right of first refusal clauses).
16. See Bartlett & Andrews, supra note 3, at 159; Seagram-DuPont Agreement, supra
note 5, at A-85 - A-86 (containing right of first refusal provision setting forth procedure
Seagram should follow to afford DuPont opportunity to purchase DuPont's stock prior to
Seagram's sale or transfer of stock). Because of unique timing and valuation problems associated
with the different methods by which an investor may dispose of shares, the right of first refusal
10191985]
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its shares upon sale by the investor benefits both parties to the standstill
agreement because the right of first refusal enables the investor to sell out
of the investment program while allaying management's concern that the
stock will fall into unfriendly hands.' 7 Clauses describing stock transfers
which the investor may consummate after the issuer has chosen not to
exercise its right of first refusal or those transfers which are exempt from
the right of first refusal frequently accompany the right of first refusal
provision.' 8 An investor's disposition of shares pursuant to a typical broker's
transaction on a public trading market, for example, might be exempt from
the right of first refusal requirement. 9 Transfers resulting from the issuer's
merger or consolidation also commonly are excepted from the issuer's right
of first refusal20
Another area of concern to management embodied in standstill agree-
ments is the voting rights of the investor. 2' Like stock limitation and transfer
provision should distinguish among, and provide tailored procedures for, sales made in the
open market, sales made pursuant to third party offers, and sales made pursuant to tender
offers. See Bartlett & Andrews, supra note 3, at 160-63. Authorities generally recognize right
of first refusal clauses as a reasonable restriction on the sale of stock, provided the issuing
corporation exercises the right within a reasonable time period. See Irwin v. West End
Development Co., 481 F.2d 34, 38 (10th Cir. 1973) (first refusal provision is valid because
provision operates not as absolute prohibition on transferability but as reasonable restriction
on transfer), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1158 (1974); Ryan v. J. Walter Thompson Co., 322 F.
Supp. 307, 312-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (first option provision is valid when provision does not
prevent transfer of stock but merely delays transfer), aff'd per curiam, 453 F.2d 444 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 907 (1972); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 202(c)(1) (1983) (authorizing right
of first refusal provision provided issuer exercises first refusal within reasonable time period);
see also Bialkin, supra note 3, at 109-11 (considering legality of right of first refusal provisions
in context of standstill agreement governing investor's friendly minority investment).
17. See Bartlett & Andrews, supra note 3, at 159 (right of first refusal provision permits
investor to dispose of holdings while enabling issuer to prevent undesirable transfers of issuer's
stock).
18. See Nathan, supra 4, at 360 (right of first refusal generally does not apply to all
resales); Whittaker-Smith Agreement, supra note 5, at 7, 15 (permitting investor to sell stock
in public offering if issuer does not exercise right of first refusal); Martin Marietta-Allied
Standstill agreement, supra note 5, at 77-78 (listing described dispositions of issuer's stock
which do not require consent of issuer).
19. See Nathan, supra note 4, at 359. In addition to sales made pursuant to a public
offering, sales which typically are exempt from the first refusal right or which the investor may
make after the issuer has chosen not to exercise its option to purchase include sales made in
accordance with SEC rule 144 permitting resale of certain restricted securities without registra-
tion, sales representing only a small percentage of the outstanding shares of the issuer, and
sales made to entities agreeing to be bound by the terms of the investor-issuer standstill
agreement. See id.; Bartlett & Andrews, supra note 3, at 158-59; Seagram-DuPont Agreement,
supra note 4, at A-82, A-83.
20. See Standstill Agreement Memorandum, supra note 2, at A-48, A-49; Nathan, supra
note 4, at 359-60.
21. See, e.g., Whittaker Corporation-Smith Agreement, supra note 5, at 4-6 (provision
limiting investor's voting rights); Martin-Marietta Allied Standstill Agreement, supra note 5,
at 779-81 (provision describing matters relating to investor's voting rights); Seagram-DuPont
Agreement, supra note 5, at A-81, A-82 (prescribing voting restrictions).
1020 [Vol. 42:1015
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restriction provisions, voting provisions in standstill agreements serve to avert
control battles by prohibiting the investor from participating in certain
voting-related activities with shares acquired under the standstill agreement.
22
Perhaps the most noteworthy type of voting activity often prohibited under
standstill agreements is the investor's ability to engage in proxy contests,
voting trusts, and other types of voting mechanisms commonly employed to
oppose management.A Although no court has yet ruled on the validity of
restrictive voting provisions commonly found in standstill agreements, com-
mentators have urged that voting restrictions in most standstill agreements
present potential problems of legality. 24 Critics of comprehensive voting
restrictions in standstill agreements have suggested that the drafters of future
standstill agreements restructure voting rights provisions to permit the inves-
tor to vote shares freely on issues of particular importance to the investor.25
22. See Bartlett & Andrews, supra note 2, at 164 (voting restriction provision reinforces
provisions designed to avoid control battles).
23. Id. at 164-65; Nathan, supra note 4, at 362-63. An example of a restrictive voting
provision is found in the Seagram-DuPont Agreement which prohibits Seagram from depositing
shares in voting trusts, soliciting proxies or becoming a participant in a solicitation of proxies,
or joining any other similar voting arrangement with third parties. Seagram-DuPont Agree-
ment, supra note 5, at A-82. See Martin Marietta-Allied Agreement, supra note 5, at 779-80
(voting rights provision); City Investing-NVF Agreements, supra note 5, at 1-2 (investor's
covenants with respect to limitation of voting privileges).
24. See Note, supra note 14, at 1097-101 (arguing that restrictive voting provisions of
standstill agreements constitute illicit vote selling and therefore are illegal under common law,
against public policy, and violative of state statutes); see Bartlett & Andrews, supra note 3, at
165-67 (raising legal arguments which contracting investors may assert in bargaining for less
restrictive voting provisions); infra note 25 (arguments and proposals for less restrictive voting
provisions in standstill agreements).
25. See Bartlett & Andrews, supra note 3, at 167. Bartlett and Andrews maintain that
investors executing standstill agreements commonly sacrifice leverage over the investment by
acceding to comprehensive voting restrictions. Id. at 165. Bartlett and Andrews propose three
arguments which the investor should assert in bargaining for less restrictive voting provisions.
See id. First, if the investor qualifies as a controlling shareholder, then the investor should
argue that in situations in which management endorses a reckless or fraudulent course of action,
an agreement to vote as the issuer dictates may infringe upon the controlling shareholder's
fiduciary duty not to oppress or defraud the minority shareholders. Id. at 166; see Pepper v.
Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939) (dominant or controlling shareholder is fiduciary); see generally
H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 240 at 653-56 (discussing fiduciary duties
of controlling shareholders and oppression of minority shareholders). Second, the investor
should assert that restrictive voting may cause the investor's own shareholders to bring derivative
suits because the relinquishment of the investor's voting autonomy renders the investor powerless
to oppose issuer actions not in the best interest of the investor's own shareholders. Bartlett &
Andrews, supra note 3, at 166. Finally, the investor should alert the issuer to the possibility
that the New York Stock Exchange might prohibit listing of the issuer's shares since the
Exchange refuses to list securities constituting nonvoting common stock. Id.; see N.Y.S.E.
Company Manual § A 15, at A-280 (1981). Another commentator has argued that stock held
by an investor under a standstill agreement should be either nonvoting or voted in the same
proportion as the shares voted by all other shareholders, thus effectively depriving the issuer of
the opportunity to dictate voting of shares subject to a standstill agreement. See Note, supra
note 14, at 1106-08 (proposed solutions to restrictive voting provisions in standstill agreements).
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While the purpose of the primary provisions included in standstill
agreements is to serve management's objective of retaining corporate control,
other provisions frequently incorporated in standstill agreements bestow
certain privileges upon the investor.2 6 For example, standstill agreements
often contain registration rights provisions in which, subject to certain
conditions, the issuer promises to register under the Securities Act of 1933
stock held by the investor at the request of the investor.2 7 Stock registered
pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933 can be traded on the public market.29
Thus, the inclusion of registration rights in standstill agreements provides
added opportunities for the investor to dispose of acquired holdings. 29 The
breadth of registration rights allotted under a particular standstill agreement
usually is related to the extent of the acquisition limitation and transfer
restriction provisions.
30
In addition to registration rights, standstill agreements usually contain
other provisions which management may include in the standstill agreement
to induce the investor to execute such an agreement." Although infrequently,
standstill agreements may contain a board representation provision which
guarantees the investor representation on the issuing corporation's board of
directors?. 2 Board representation provisions are not prevalent in standstill
As an alternative to restrictive voting provisions, one critic has suggested that courts reverse the
good faith presumption afforded management under the business judgment rule if a standstill
agreement contains severe voting restrictions. See id. at 1109-11; infra notes 72-90 and accom-
panying text (discussion of standstill agreements in context of business judgment rule in Enterra
Corp. v. SGS Associates).
26. See infra notes 27-38 and accompanying text (discussing provisions incorporated in
standstill agreements to induce investors to execute standstill agreements).
27. See Nathan, supra note 4, at 363; Whittaker-Smith Agreement, supra note 5, at 12,
Appendix I (issuer will effect registration of stock pursuant to Securities Act of 1933 at request
of investor); Martin Marietta-Allied Standstill Agreement, supra note 5, at 795 (upon request
of investor, issuer will use best efforts to effect registration of stock held by investor).
28. See 15 U.S.C. § 781 (registration requirements for securities traded publicly).
29. See Bartlett & Andrews, supra note 5, at 172; Nathan, supra note 4, at 363-64
(exhaustive list of matters which parties to standstill agreement should include in registration
rights section). By promoting trading of the issuer's stock on the public market, registration of
the issuer's shares can operate in favor of the issuer as well as to the benefit of the investor.
See Bartlett & Andrews, supra note 3, at 172 n. 110. The investor's disposal of the issuer's share
on the public market normally will result in a broad redistribution of the issuer's shares. Id.
Thus, redistribution on the open market facilitated by providing the investor registration rights
allays the issuer's concern that a large block of stock will fall into the hands of an unfriendly
third party. Id.
30. See Nathan, supra note 4, at 363.
31. See infra notes 32-38 and accompanying text (additional provisions incorporated in
standstill agreements).
32. See Bartlett & Andrews, supra note 3, at 168-70; Nathan, supra note 4, at 326-63;
Seagram-DuPont Agreement, supra note 5, at A-84, A-85. In standstill agreements containing
board representation provisions, the parties may agree to recommend to the shareholders certain
persons as nominees to be elected to each others' board of directors. See Seagram-DuPont
Agreement, supra note 2, at A-84, A-85 (DuPont will cause Seagram representative to be elected




agreements because of the investor's potential liability arising under both the
federal securities laws" and the federal antitrust laws3 4 which may result
from the investor's direct representation on the issuer's board.
3
1
More commonly, standstill agreements contain termination clauses which
provide the investor an escape from limitations and restrictions of the
agreement upon the occurrence of certain disruptive events which may affect
adversely the investor's interest.16 For instance, most standstill agreements
afford the investor a contingent release from the stock ownership limitation
provision of the agreement, or from the agreement as a whole, in the form
of exceptions to the investor's covenant not to acquire additional shares in
the issuing corporation. 7 Events constituting exceptions to the stock owner-
33. See Bartlett & Andrews, supra note 5, at 168-69; Nathan, supra note 4, at 346-47.
Under § 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act), an investor may incur short-
swing profit liability by virtue either of the investor's 10% holdings of a registered security or
the investor's ability to designate a director under the standstill agreement, if the investor
realized a profit through a purchase and sale within a six month period. See id.; 15 U.S.C. §
78p(a), (b) (authorizing suits to recover profits realized by either 10% holder of equity security
or director in purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, of equity security within six month
period). An investor also may incur liability under rule 10b-5 promulgated under § 10(b) of the
'34 Act for trading in the issuer's stock while represented on the issuer's board. See Bartlett &
Andrews, supra note 3, at 169; Nathan, supra note 4, at 347-48; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984)
(making unlawful any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance, including fraud or deceit,
in connection with purchase or sale of any security); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 236-37 (2d Cir. 1974) (granting private right of action for defrauded
shareholders under rule lOb-5 when investor sitting on corporation's board of directors and in
possession of material information failed to either disclose information to public or abstain
from trading). Finally, an investor represented on the issuer's board risks liability under rule
10b-6 if during a market distribution of the issuer's securities the investor purchases the issuers
stock. Bartlett & Andrews, supra note 3, at 169; Nathan, supra note 4, at 348; see 17 CtF.R. §
240.10b-6 (1984). Rule lOb-6 prohibits an issuer, or any person in a control relationship with
the issuer, from trading in the issuer's securities during an ongoing market distribution. See 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (1984); Nathan, supra note 4, at 348.
34. See Bartlett & Andrews, supra note 3, at 169; Nathan, supra note 4, at 350-51. Under
the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (the H-S-R Act), an investor
acquiring up to 10% of an issuer's outstanding voting securities solely for the purpose of
investment is exempt from the H-S-R Act's notification requirement. See 15 U.S.C. § 7A(c)(9)
(1981); 16 C.F.R. § 802.9 (1985). An investor represented on an issuer's board, relying on the
"solely for investment" exemption, may be in violation of the H-S-R Act's notification
requirement because the Federal Trade Commission has determined that a shareholder's
nomination of a candidate to the issuer's board of directors is inconsistent with the solely for
purposes of investment exemption. See Nathan, supra note 4, at 350-51; Bartlett & Andrews,
supra note 3, at 169 n.100; 15 U.S.C. § 18a(c)(9) (1983); 16 C.F.R. § 802.9 (1985).
35. See Bartlett & Andrews, supra note 3, at 168-69 (few standstill agreements contain
board representation provisions); supra notes 33 & 34 (investor's representation on issuer's
board may be violative of federal securities and federal antitrust laws).
36. See FLEISCHER, supra note 4, at 148 (discussing termination of standstill agreements);
infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text (recognizing termination provisions in standstill
agreements and events causing termination).
37. See Nathan, supra note 4, at 355-57 (discussing exceptions to stock ownership
limitation in standstill agreements); Standstill Agreement Memorandum, supra note 2, at A-52,
A-53 (suggesting possible exceptions to the stock ownership limitation, including acquisition of
1985] 1023
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
ship limitation typically include a substantial change in control of the
corporation resulting from a merger or acquisition, a sale by the issuer of a
significant portion of the assets of the corporation, or a public announcement
of a third party tender offer for a significant amount of the issuer's shares.a8
In addition to releases in the form of exceptions to the stock ownership
limitation, standstill agreements may contain an additional termination pro-
vision which permits either party to terminate the entire agreement upon the
occurrence of specified events not already recognized as exceptions to the
owernship limitation such as material breaches of any of the core provisions
of the standstill agreement.3 9 Finally, standstill agreements usually include a
miscellaneous provision which often contains an expression of the issuer's
entitlement to judicial enforcement of the provisions of the agreement.
4 0
Although standstill agreements governing minority investment programs
generally include several characteristic provisions, the scope of the terms and
additional stock, tender offers, open-market or block accumulations, and mergers); Bartlett &
Andrews, supra note 3, at 155-56 (discussing termination provisions in standstill agreements);
infra note 38 and accompanying text (events typically representing exceptions to investor's
covenant not to acquire additional shares in issuing corporation); supra notes 9-13 and
accompanying text (discussion of stock ownership limitation).
38. See Bartlett and Andrews, supra note 3, at 155-56; Nathan, supra note 4, at 355-57;
Standstill Agreement Memorandum, supra note 2, at A-52; see also Seagram-DuPont Agree-
ment, supra note 5, at A-80, A-81 (investor may acquire issuer's stock without regard to stated
limitation of 25% if tender offer is commenced for up to 20% of issuer's stock, acquisition of
up to 20% occurs, or any person or 13D group becomes beneficial owner of either 20% of
issuer's stock or amount greater than that held by investor); City Investing-NVF Letter
Agreement, supra note 5, at 3-4 (ownership limitation of 21% shall terminate if successful
tender offer results in entity holding in excess of 21% of issuer's securities, if an entity files
under federal securities laws to acquire more than 10% of outstanding shares of issuer, or if
issuer merges, consolidates or sells substantially all of its assets).
39. See Seagram-DuPont Agreement, supra note 5, at A-87 (termination provision
providing that either party may terminate agreement if other party breaches one of that party's
covenants, if specified nominees are not elected to each others boards, or if release of ownership
limitation occurs pursuant to provided exceptions).
40. See Nathan, supra note 4, at 357; Bartlett & Andrews, supra note 3, at 173 n.113;
Standstill Agreement Memorandum, supra note 2, at A-54. The miscellaneous provision of a
standstill agreement, or its equivalent, commonly includes a statement by the issuer that the
issuer will be irreparably damaged if the investor breaches any of the provisions of the agreement,
and that the issuer accordingly will be entitled to seek injunctive relief to prevent further
breaches and to specifically enforce the provisions of the agreement. See Nathan, supra note 4,
at 357; Standstill Agreement Memorandum, supra note 2, at A-54; Whittaker-Smith Agree-
ment, supra note 5, at 29. Other standstill agreements recognize both parties to the agreement
as having access to the courts to enforce the provision of the agreement. See Seagram-DuPont
Agreement, supra note 5, at A-88. Also within the miscellaneous provision, or in addition to
that provision, standstill agreements often embody a severability clause. See Bartlett & Andrews,
supra note 3, at 173 n.113; Martin Marietta-Allied Standstill Agreement, supra note 4, at 792
(severability clause). A severability clause typically provides that if a court finds any of the
provisions of the standstill agreement unenforceable, the remainder of the provisions and
covenants of the agreement remain in full force and effect. See Bartlett & Andrews, supra note




provisions of a particular standstill agreement will vary depending upon both
the objectives and the bargaining strengths of the parties to the agreement. 4'
Invariably, however, standstill agreements restrict the investor from acquiring
shares in the issuer beyond the negotiated limit.4 2 When the issuer executes
a standstill agreement to prevent either the investor or a third party from
acquiring control of the issuing corporation, 43 the standstill agreement op-
erates as a defensive measure to a takeover.4 Defensive measures taken by
corporate boards of directors to resist takeover attempts are subject to
shareholder challenge because only those defensive measures having a proper
corporate purpose are a valid exercise of the directors' business judgment.
4 5
41. See Bartlett & Andrews, supra note 3, at 15 (contents of standstill agreement vary
with peculiarities of deal and bargaining strengths of parties); Fleischer & Sternberg, Corporate
Acquisitions, 12 REV. SEc. REG. 937 (1979) (component provisions of standstill agreements
differ depending upon circumstances of parties, their bargaining strengths, and imagination of
drafters). See also Nathan, supra note 4, at 364-74 (discussion of strategic, legal, and related-
implications of both preventive and defensive minority investment programs).
42. See Nathan, supra note 4, at 354 (under standstill agreement issuer invariably will
seek to limit investor's holdings); Felischer & Sternberg, supra note 41, at 938 (every standstill
agreement will restrict investor's purchaser of issuer's securities); supra notes 9-13 and accom-
panying text (discussion of investor's ownership limitation).
43. See supra notes 4, 10-13 and accompanying text (examining issuer's objectives in
executing standstill agreement).
44. See FLEISCRER, supra note 4, at 144-48, 372-74 (issuer's execution of standstill
agreement in context of creeping acquisition, and issuer's transfer of shares into friendly hands
accompanied by standstill agreement, are defensive tactics to avoid unwanted acquisition);
LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 1, at § 6.06[41 (management has used standstill agreements
to defend against takeovers); Pitt, Fiduciary Duties of Officers and Directors In Control
Contests, in PLI, HOSTILE BATTLES FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 387, 478 (D. Block & H. Pitt eds.
1984) (PLI Corporate Law & Practice Handbook Series No. 439) (categorizing issuance of stock
into friendly hands accompanied by standstill agreement as defensive measure). See also Note,
supra note 14, at 1102 (arguing that standstill agreements are defensive tactics).
45. See Treadway Companies, Inc. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 383-84 (2d Cir. 1980)
(upholding director's decision to oppose corporate takeover against allegedly improper primary
purpose challenge); Crouse-Hinds Co. v. Internorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 702 (2d Cir. 1980)
(ruling that plaintiff failed to show improper motive on part of directors in effecting merger
and opposing tender offer). Corporate directors have a fiduciary duty to act in the best interest
of the corporation and its shareholders. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939).
Corporate directors therefore must implement measures to deter corporate takeovers that in the
director's best judgment are detrimental to the interests of the corporation and shareholders.
See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 288 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092
(1981); Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157, 1161 (1st Cir. 1977); Northwest Industries, Inc. v. B.F.
Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712 (N.D. Ill. 1969). Corporate directors, in fulfilling their
fiduciary duties, must act in good faith, upon an ascertainment of relevant facts and law, and
devoid of self interest in the transaction. Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933, 950
(N.D. Il1. 1982); Kaplan v. Goldsamt, 380 A.2d 556, 568 (Del. Ch. 1977). In recognition that
a corporation's board of directors is peculiarly suited to making business decisions on behalf
of the corporation, courts afford corporate directors a rebuttable presumption that the directors'
action is valid. Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 630-31, 419 N.Y.S.2d 902, 926-27, 393
N.E.2d 994, 1000 (N.Y.C.A. 1979); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. Supr.,
1971). The rebuttable presumption courts accord the business decisions of corporate directors
is known as the business judgment rule. See generally Johnson & Osborne, The Role of the
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Until recently, no court had ruled on the validity of the use of standstill
agreements to avoid control contests while governing an investor's substantial
minority interest in an issuing corporation.46 In Enterra Corporation v. SGS
Associates,47 however, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania endorsed the use of standstill agreements to promote
stability between a corporation and a substantial shareholder when a valid
corporate purpose exists for executing an agreement.
4
In Enterra, SGS Associates (SGS), an investment partnership, accumu-
Business Judgment Rule In A Litigious Society, 15 VA. U. L. Rav. 49, 51-23 (1980) (discussion
of business judgment rule as shield for insulating corporate directors from personal liability for
errors in business judgment); Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HoFsTRA L. REv.
93 (1979) (comprehensive discussion of business judgment rule). Under the business judgment
rule, courts allocate the burden of proof to the plaintiff to show either fraud, bad faith, abuse
of discretion, or self dealing on the part of board of directors. See Treadway Companies, Inc.
v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980) (plaintiff has burden of demonstrating that
director had self interest in transaction); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 293 (3rd Cir.
1980) (under Delaware law plaintiff must show at minimum bad faith of directors), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 999 (1981); Whittaker Corp v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933, 950 (N.D. I11. 1982) (burden
rests with plaintiff to show director's bad faith or abuse of discretion); Northwest Industries,
Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712 (N.D. Il1. 1969) (plaintiff must prove fraud
or oppressive conduct to set aside director's action). Once the plaintiff has made a showing to
rebut the presumption in favor of the board of directors, the burden shifts to the board of
directors to demonstrate the validity of the transaction. Treadway Companies, Inc. v. Care
Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 293 (3d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981). In reviewing actions that directors may take to deter
takeovers, courts have relied on a "primary purpose" test as an alternative to, or in conjunction
with, the business judgment rule. Pitt, supra note 44, at 452, 459; see, e.g., Panter v. Marshall
Field & Co. 646 F.2d 271, 296-97 (7th Cir.) (reading primary purpose test into business judgment
rule), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Treadway Companies, Inc. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d
357, 382-83 (2d Cir. 1980) (integrating primary purpose test and business judgment rule); Heit
v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157, 1161-62 (1st Cir. 1977) (applying primary purpose test). Under the
primary purpose test, courts consider whether corporate directors, in taking corporate action,
primarily intended to effect a proper corporate purpose or to entrench the existing board of
directors. See Crouse-Hinds Co. v. Internorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 702-03 (under primary
purpose test, finding insufficient proof that directors motivation for consummating merger was
retention of control). Courts have required plaintiffs to show that the directors' desire to remain
in office was the sole or primary motive for the directors' action. See Johnson v. Trueblood,
629 F.2d 287, 292-93 (3d Cir. 1980) (plaintiffs must show retention of control was sole or
primary purpose of directors' action to overcome presumption of validity), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 999 (1981); Warner Communications, Inc. v. Murdoch, 581 F. Supp. 1482, 1491 (D. Del.
1984) (directors' defensive measures are legitimate unless executed for the primary purpose of
entrenchment); but see Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., [1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. RaP. (CCH) 91,564 at 98,867-98, 868 n.7 (retreating from primary purpose test in requiring
directors to prove that transaction was fair and reasonable once self dealing or bad faith is
demonstrated).
46. Bartlett & Andrews, supra note 3, at 147; see Enterra Corporation v. SGS Associates,
600 F. Supp. 678, 688 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (recognizing that no court had challenged general validity
of standstill agreements).
47. 600 F. Supp. 678 (E.D. Pa. 1985).




lated nearly five percent of the outstanding common stock of Enterra
Corporation (Enterra).49 Desiring to acquire additional stock in Enterra at a
more favorable price, SGS partners met with Enterra's chairman and ex-
pressed the partnership's interest in purchasing additional shares in Enterra
for investment purposes.5 0 At the meeting, SGS did not convey to Enterra's
chairman any desire to acquire control of Enterra.51 Through negotiations
following the initial meeting, Enterra and SGS executed a standstill agree-
ment. 2 The standstill agreement, which was to remain in effect for ten years
from the time of execution, prohibited SGS from acquiring more than fifteen
percent of Enterra's outstanding common stock except under certain limited
circumstances provided in the agreement. 3 The standstill agreement also
prohibited SGS from making a tender offer for Enterra stock and from
aiding and abetting a third party tender offer. 4
Approximately one year after the parties executed the standstill agree-
ment, SGS requested that Enterra amend the agreement to allow SGS to
acquire more than fifteen percent of Enterra's outstanding shares.15 Several
months later at a meeting with Enterra's chairman, SGS again requested that
Enterra amend the standstill agreement to allow SGS to purchase more shares
than the agreement permitted. 57 Enterra's chairman stated that the Enterra
board did not favor amending the agreement.5 8 SGS responded with a written
49. Id. at 682. The plaintiff in Enterra, Enterra Corporation, is a Pennsylvania corporation
which provides services and products to the petroleum industry. Id. at 681. Enterra's common
stock is traded on the New York and Philadelphia stock exchanges. Id.
50. Id. at 682.
51. Id.
52. Id. See Enterra-SGS Agreement (Nov. 30, 1982) (filed with SEC by SGS on February
10, 1983) (on file at vashington and Lee Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Enterra-SGS
Agreement]. In Enterra, the plaintiffs disclosed the terms of the standstill agreement in a press
release and in Enterra's 1983 and 1984 proxy statements mailed to shareholders. 600 F. Supp.
at 682. Upon acquiring 5 percent of Enterra's outstanding shares, SGS filed a Schedule 13D
with the SEC with a copy of the standstill agreement attached. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. 78m(d)(1)
(requiring any person who acquires more than 5% of any class of equity securities to file
Schedule 13D with SEC and with exchanges on which issuer's securities are traded).
53. 600 F. Supp. at 682; see Enterra-SGS Agreement, supra note 52, at 6 (stating that
no member of SOS shall acquire greater than 15% of Enterra voting securities).
54. 600 F. Supp. at 682; see Enterra-SGS Agreement, supra note 52, at II (stating that
SGS shall not acquire or offer to acquire Enterra voting securities by means of tender offer or
suggest or announce SGS' willingness or desire to have third party make tender offer).
55. 600 F. Supp. at 682.
56. Id. Following the Enterra board's refusal to amend the standstill agreement in Enterra,
a breakdown in the relations between Enterra and SGS occurred. Id.
57. Id. In Enterra, SGS' request to amend the standstill agreement included a demand
for representation on Enterra's board and a request to permit an increase in SOS' holdings
above 15%. See id.; Brief of Plaintiffs in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for a Mandatory
Preliminary Injunction at 17, Enterra Corporation v. SOS Associates, 600 F. Supp. 678 (E.D.
Pa. 1985) [hereinafter cited as Plaintiff's Brief]; supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text
(discussing board representation provisions in standstill agreements).
58. 600 F. Supp. at 682.
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proposal stating that SGS would offer to acquire any and all outstanding
shares of Enterra at a price of twenty-one dollars per share if Enterra's
board approved. 9
After considering the SGS proposal, the Enterra board declined to
approve the offer or to amend the agreement. 60 In response to the Enterra
Board's decision, SGS filed an amendment to SGS' Schedule 13D 6' and
attached a copy of the proposal. 62 A disruption in the trading market for
Enterra stock resulted, and the New York Stock Exchange halted trading of
Enterra stock. 63 Soon thereafter, the Enterra board reconsidered the SGS
proposal and, with the assistance of a financial advisor, concluded that in
the best interest of the shareholders, Enterra should neither accept the SGS
proposal nor amend the standstill agreement. 6
Enterra filed suit against SGS seeking permanent injunctive relief pro-
hibiting SGS from acquiring or offering to acquire Enterra common stock
in violation of the standstill agreement. 6 Enterra alleged that SGS breached
the standstill agreement and violated various federal and state securities laws
by demanding that the Enterra board either amend the standstill agreement
or approve SGS' offer to acquire any and all outstanding shares. 66 SGS filed
various counterclaims seeking a mandatory preliminary injunction. 67 SGS
sought an order from the court requiring that Enterra consider the adequacy
of any SGS proposal, convey to each shareholder of record any such proposal
the Enterra board had rejected, and allow each shareholder to decide whether
to accept or reject the offer described in SGS' proposal s.6  In support of its
59. Id. Prior to making an offer to purchase Enterra shares at a price of $21 per share,
SGS had filed an amendment to the partnership's Schedule 13D indicating that SGS had decided
to explore other alternatives with respect to the Enterra investment. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. m(d)(2)
(requiring investor holding more than 5% of an equity to file amendment to investor's Schedule
13D if change occurs in facts set forth in investor's Schedule 13D). Enterra and the investment
community interpreted SGS' expression of a desire to explore other alternatives as an intentional
attempt by SOS to make Enterra the potential target of a takeover. Plaintiff's Brief, supra note
57, at 18. At the time SOS set forth the proposal to offer $21 per share, Enterra common stock
was selling for $16 per share. 600 F. Supp. at 682; Memorandum in Support of Defendants'
Motion for Mandatory Preliminary Injunction at 8, Enterra Corporation v. SGS Associates,
600 F. Supp. 678 (E.D. Pa. 1985) [hereinafter cited as Defendants' Memorandum].
60. 600 F. Supp. at 683.
61. See 15 U.S.C. 78m(d)(2) (requiring person holding more than 5% of an outstanding
equity security in a publicly held corporation to file amendment to investor's Schedule 13D if
change occurs in facts set forth in investor's Schedule 13D); supra note 4 (explaining Schedule
13D requirement).
62. 600 F. Supp. at 683.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 678, 683.
66. Id. at 680; Plaintiff's Brief supra note 57, at 21-22. In addition to alleging that SOS'
actions violated the securities laws, the plaintiffs in Enterra asserted that SGS committed fraud,
breach of contract, and violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act
(RICO). 600 F. Supp. at 680; see 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. (RICO).
67. 600 F. Supp. at 680-81 see infra note 70 (discussing preliminary injunction standards).
68. 600 F. Supp. at 681.
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motion for a mandatory preliminary injunction, SGS asserted that its inability
under the terms of the standstill to make offers directly to Enterra share-
holders imposed on the Enterra board a further fiduciary duty to convey to
Enterra shareholders the facts and terms of any SGS offer extended through
the Enterra board.69
In considering whether to grant injunctive relief against the Enterra
board,7- the Enterra court first examined standards of conduct for officers
and directors of a corporation in managing the business affairs of a corpo-
ration.7 ' Primarily focusing on application of the business judgment rule,
the Enterra court observed that the business judgment rule operates as a
shield to protect corporate directors from liability with respect to business
decisions made in conducting the affairs of the corporation.7 2 The business
judgment rule permits a presumption that in making a business decision the
directors acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the interests of
the corporation and shareholders.7 3 The Enterra court noted that the good
faith presumption the business judgment rule affords is strengthened when
69. Id.; see Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 59, at 13-14 (arguing that fiduciary
duty that directors of corporations owe shareholders requires Enterra board to consider adequacy
of proposals, to inform shareholders of specifics of proposal, and to permit shareholders to
accept proposals board rejects because standstill agreement prohibits SGS from making offer
directly to shareholders).
70. See 600 F. Supp. at 681. In Enterra, subsequent to SGS' request for a preliminary
injunction, an individual shareholder of Enterra filed a shareholders' derivative action against
the Enterra board. Id. In seeking relief identical to that sought by SGS, the Enterra shareholder
alleged that the Enterra board breached the board's fiduciary duty to the corporation and
shareholders in executing a standstill agreement which restricted SGS' ability to purchase Enterra
stock. Id. The district court consolidated SGS' claim and the shareholder's derivative claim for
argument on whether to grant injunctive relief against the Enterra board. Id. Preceeding
discussion of the merits of both the movants' claims with a review of preliminary injunction
standards, the Enterra court observed that in order for the movants to obtain a preliminary
injunction, the movants must demonstrate both a likelihood of success on the merits and
irreparable harm absent injunctive relief. Id. at 683; see Klitzman & Gallagher v. Kurt, 744
F.2d 955, 958-59 (3d Cir. 1984). Noting that SGS sought a mandatory preliminary injunction,
the district court added that a court should exercise sparingly the power to issue a mandatory
injunction. Id. at 684; see United States v. Spectro Food Corporation, 544 F.2d 1175, 1181 (3d
Cir. 1981); see also 7 J. MooRE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcTIcE 65.04[1] (2ND ED. 1984)
(preliminary injunction serves purpose of preserving status quo pending final determination of
action whereas mandatory preliminary injunction requires subject of mandatory injunction to
take affirmative action).
71. See 600 F. Supp. at 684-87 (Enterra court's discussion of director's fiduciary duty
and business judgment rule).
72. See id. at 685 (business judgment rule protects corporate directors from shareholder
interference in discharging director's fiduciary duties to corporation); see also supra note 45
(discussion of business judgment rule and primary purpose test). In Enterra, the district court
remarked that shareholders unsatisfied with the directors judgment in effectuating a corporate
action should replace the directors through the corporate voting process. 600 F. Supp. at 685;
see M. Lipton, Takeover Bids and the Targets' Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101, 116 (1979).
73. See 600 F. Supp. at 685 (quoting Note, Protecting Shareholders Against Partial and
Two-Tiered Takeovers: The "Poison Pill" Preferred, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1964, 1969 (1984);
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (providing clear statement of business
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the board of directors consists of independent directors and when the board
has consulted with outside experts.74 The court also explained that to
overcome the presumption in favor of the directors, the plaintiff must show
that the directors' sole or primary purpose for the transaction was to retain
control of the corporation. 75 Implicitly recognizing that the execution of a
standstill agreement may operate as a defensive measure to avert a control
battle, the district court considered the applicabilty of the business judgment
rule to defensive tactics used to resist takeover attempts. 76 The court con-
cluded that even in the context of defensive tactics, the business judgment
rule insulates directors from liability unless the directors employed the
defensive strategy for the primary purpose of assuring their continuance in
office.
77
Applying the business judgment rule to the Enterra board's decision to
execute the standstill agreement, 7 the Enterra court noted that Enterra's
chairman submitted an affidavit which revealed a number of valid corporate
judgment rule in context of applying rule to dismissal of derivative litigation); supra note 45
(discussion of business judgment rule and primary purpose test).
74. 600 F. Supp. at 685; see Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 277, 294 (7th
Cir.) (presence of majority of independent directors on corporation's board strengthens good
faith presumption of business judgment rule), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); cf. Bartlett &
Andrews, supra note 3, at 150 n.25 (supporting use of standstill agreements if directors have
consulted legal and business advisors before consummating agreement).
75. 600 F. Supp. at 686; see Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 293 (3d Cir. 1980) (in
order to overcome presumption in favor of directors, plaintiff must establish that directors'
sole or primary motive was retention of control), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981); see also
Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d at 294 (plaintiffs must show under business judgment
rule that improper motives predominated director's action), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981);
cf. Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157, 1161 (1st Cir. 1977) (directors may not utilize defensive tactic
of issuing large block of corporation's stock for sole purpose of retaining control); supra note
45 (discussion of business judgment rule and primary purpose test).
76. See 600 F. Supp. at 686-87 (considering applicability of business judgment rule to
defensive measures directors employ to resist takeover); supra note 45 (discussion of business
judgment rule and primary purpose test); see also supra note 44 and accompanying text
(standstill agreements may operate as defensive measure against takeover).
77. See 600 F. Supp. at 686-87; Bartlett & Andrews, supra note 3, at 148-49 (citing cases
supporting proposition that courts applying business judgment rule have approved director's
defensive tactics under shareholder challenge); see also Warner Communications v. Murdoch,
581 F. Supp. 1482, 1491 (D. Del. 1984) (director's defensive tactics are legitimate provided
directors do not employ such tactics for primary purpose of entrenchment). In considering the
applicability of the business judgment rule to director's defensive tactics, the Enterra court
recognized that the directors' fiduciary duty may obligate the directors to oppose takeovers that
the directors perceive as detrimental to the corporation. 600 F. Supp. at 686; see Panter v.
Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 298-99 (7th Cir.) (directors must evaluate and oppose
those tender offers which directors believe are detrimental to corporation even if opposition is
at expense of shareholders short term interests), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Treadway
Companies, Inc. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 381 (2d Cir. 1980) (determining that director's
opposition to takeover was reasonable).
78. See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text (Enterra court's discussion of business
judgment rule). Like many courts considering shareholder challenges to director's anti-takeover
maneuvers, the Enterra court applied a combination of the business judgment rule and primary
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purposes for executing the standstill agreement with SGS. 79 The court added
that Enterra had not executed the agreement in response to a takeover threat
because at the time of contracting, neither SGS nor a third party had
expressed a desire to obtain control of Enterra.s0 Although the Enterra court
conceded that retention of control was a motive for executing the agreement,
the court maintained that other valid motives supported the Enterra board's
decision to enter into the standstill agreement.8' The court accordingly
concluded that SGS could not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the
merits of the claim that the Enterra board breached its fiduciary duty in
executing the standstill agreement.
8 2
Consistent with the court's conclusion that the execution of the standstill
agreement was not a breach of the board's fiduciary duty, the Enterra court
chose not to examine the merits of the terms and provisions of the Enterra-
SGS standstill agreement.83 Instead, the court approved of the use of standstill
agreements to govern minority investment programs. 84 The court noted that
commentators have viewed the use of standstill agreements favorably. 8 The
purpose test. See 600 F. Supp. at 685-87; supra note 45 (discussion of business judgment rule
and primary purpose test).
79. 600 F. Supp. at 688-89. Relying on the affidavit of Enterra's chairman, the district
court in Enterra observed that the standstill agreement provided numerous corporate benefits
including the retention of key employees, the stabilization of the day-to-day business of the
corporation, the settling of the trading market for Enterra stock, and the preservation of the
directors' ability to sell the corporation under more favorable circumstances. Id. at 689.
80. See id. at 682, 689; supra text accompanying note 51 (SGS did not convey desire to
acquire control of Enterra at meeting preceeding execution of standstill agreement).
81. 600 F. Supp. at 689. The Enterra court concluded that the Enterra board's primary
purpose in executing the standstill agreement was to establish a stable relationship with SGS.
See id. at 689 (standstill agreements create stable relationship between issuer and substantial
shareholder); see also Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292-93 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 999 (1981). In Johnson, the Third Circuit explained that a plaintiff seeking to overcome
the good faith presumption of the business judgment must demonstrate that the directors desire
to retain control was more than just one of several motives behind the director's action. 1d.
Recognizing that retention of control always might be one of the motives in any action a
director takes, the Third Circuit concluded that a plaintiff cannot rebut the presumption under
the business judgment rule unless he can show that the directors' desire to retain control was
the primary motive for the directors' action. Id.
82. 600 F. Supp. at 689.
83. See id. at 687-88 (Enterra court's discussion of validity of standstill agreement).
84. See id. at 688 (citing Bartlett & Andrews, supra note 3, at 150, for conclusion that
courts should not second guess director's decision to execute standstill agreement pursuant to
proper corporate objective if directors have consulted expert advice).
85. Id. at 687. See Bartlett & Andrews, supra note 3, at 143 (in depth examination of
standstill agreements as instrument used to govern investor's substantial minority investment);
Bialkin, supra note 3, at 91 (outlining various uses of standstill agreements in corporate
transactions); Fleischer & Sternberg, supra note 3, at 937 (overview of relevant matters
concerning standstill agreements). But see Note, supra note 14, at 1097-1110 (arguing that
restrictive voting provisions commonly found in standstill agreements constitute illicit vote
selling and therefore are illegal under common law, against public policy, and violative of state
statutes).
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court then summarized briefly the essential provisions 6 and purpose87 of a
standstill agreement. Observing that standstill agreements may confer benefits
on both the issuing corporation and the investing shareholder, the court
determined that under the business judgment rule courts should not second-
guess a board of directors' decision to execute a standstill agreement which facili-
tates a valid corporate purpose when the directors have consulted expert
advisors before consummating the agreement.8" Finally, the Enterra court
recognized that no court has considered the general validity of the type of
standstill agreement Enterra and SGS had executed or the authority of a
corporate board of directors to execute such an agreement.89 In support of
the validity of standstill agreements, however, the Enterra court relied on
several recent cases which suggest or imply that a standstill agreement is a
valid and enforceable contract.90
The district court in Enterra lastly addressed the merits of SGS' claim
86. See 600 F. Supp. at 687 (recognizing stock ownership limitation and transfer restriction
provisions in standstill agreements); see also supra notes 8-40 and accompanying text (discussing
distinct provisions commonly found in standstill agreements).
87. See 600 F. Supp. at 687. In Enterra, the district court observed that standstill
agreements facilitate the objectives of the issuing corporation's directors to define the relation-
ship with a significant investor and to avoid the unsettling impact on the corporation's business
caused by the threat of a takeover. Id. The court added that in executing a standstill agreement,
the directors of a corporation may seek to prevent a costly control battle with either the
contracting shareholder or potential third party bidders. Id.; see supra notes 10-13 and
accompanying text (describing means by which ownership limitation provisions of standstill
agreements facilitate issuer's objective of avoiding control battle). The Enterra court also
recognized that standstill agreements may permit the contracting shareholder to acquire shares
in the issuer at a lower price than the investor would incur absent the standstill agreement. 600
F. Supp. at 687; see infra notes 104-106 (explaining effect of standstill agreement on price of
issuer's stock in regard to contracting shareholder's further acquisitions).
88. 600 F. Supp. at 688 (citing Bartlett & Andrews, supra note 3, at 150).
89. Id. While recognizing that no court had challenged the general validity of standstill
agreements, the district court in Enterra noted that the court probably would question the
enforceability of the voting restrictions provision of a standstill agreement if such a provision
were at issue. See id.; supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text (discussing voting provisions in
standstill agreements); see also Note, supra note 14, at 1093 (arguing that restrictive voting
provisions in standstill agreements constitute illicit vote selling and therefore are illegal under
common law, against public policy, and violative of state statutes). The plaintiff's brief,
however, indicated that because a severance clause governed the various provisions of the
standstill agreement, the remainder of the agreement would remain in effect even if the court
found that the voting provision of the agreement was unenforceable. See Plaintiff's Brief, supra
note 57, at 38-39; Enterra-SGS Agreement, supra note 52, at 32-33 (severability provision);
supra note 40 (addressing severability clause).
90. See 600 F. Supp. at 688; see also Biechele v. Cedar Point, Inc., 747 F.2d 209, 216
(6th Cir. 1984) (standstill agreement having effect of keeping friendly third party in minority
stockholder position held not violative of federal securities laws); General Portland, Inc. v.
LaFarge Coppee S.A., [1982-83 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,148 AT 95,540
(N.D. TEx. Auc. 28, 1981) (standstill agreement used in connection with exchange of confidential
information as prelude to possible merger held valid and enforceable contract); cf. Gearhart
Industries, Inc. v. Smith International, Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 711, 714-15 (5th Cir. 1984) (oral
standstill agreement presumed binding and enforceable).
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that the Enterra board owed a fiduciary duty to the corporation's sharehold-
ers to convey to those shareholders any offer that SGS extended through the
Enterra aboard.9' The court acknowledged that under normal circumstances
a shareholder is free to approach another shareholder and to extend an offer
to purchase that shareholder's interest. 92 The court noted, however, that if
SGS were to make an offer directly to Enterra shareholders, SGS would be
in violation of the standstill agreement.93 In considering the validity of SGS'
claim that the Enterra board of directors owed a fiduciary duty to the
shareholders of Enterra to convey the SGS proposal, the district court found
that no federal, state, or common law standard imposed a duty on the board
to disclose the terms of an offer.94 To the contrary, the court cited authority
suggesting that the directors of a corporation need not disclose to the
corporation's shareholders the status of negotiations between the corporation
and a potential bidder until such time as the directors have approved a
proposal.9 - The Enterra court observed, however, that SGS' request in fact
was moot because the Enterra board had included in the corporation's 1984
Quarterly Report the SGS proposal along with the board's reason for
rejecting the offer.96 Recognizing that the Enterra board's alleged duty to
consider and disclose the terms of the SGS proposal was no longer at issue,
the district court surmised that SGS' primary purpose in seeking the injunc-
tive relief was to procure an effective means of communicating the offer to
Enterra shareholders without incurring liability for breaching the standstill
91. See 600 F. Supp. at 689-91 (Enterra court's discussion of Enterra board's alleged duty
to convey offers to shareholders). The Enterra court observed that SOS might lack standing to
assert a claim of breach of fiduciary duty on the part of the directors because such a claim
gives rise to a derivative action and should be brought as such. See id. at 689. See generally H.
HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWs OF CORPORAONS § 360 at 1044-53 (distinguishing derivative
actions from direct actions). The court decided to address the merits of SGS' claim, however,
since an Enterra shareholder had brought a derivative action seeking relief identical to that of
SGS. Enterra, 600 F. Supp. at 689; see supra note 70 (noting that Enterra shareholder's
derivative action consolidated with SGS' claim).
92. 600 F. Supp. at 690.
93. Id.; see Enterra-SGS Agreement, supra note 52, at 6, 11 (prohibiting SGS from
offering to acquire Enterra stock beyond 15% limit through direct purchases or tender offers).
94. 600 F. Supp. at 691.
95. See id. at 690; see also Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 756-57 (3d Cir.
1984) (target corporation's duty to disclose merger to shareholers arises when agreement in
principle has been reached but not during preliminary merger discussions); 15 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN § 1902 (Purdon's Supp. 1985) (upon approving plan of merger or consolidation board of
directors shall submit plan to shareholders for vote); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d
271, 296-97 (7th Cir.) (directors are under no fiduciary duty to reveal to shareholders requisition
of merger offers), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981). In Enterra, the court noted that the
Enterra board had no duty to disclose the SGS proposal sine the board had not approved the
proposal. See 600 F. Supp. at 690. In addition, the court observed that had SGS made a tender
offer to acquire all of Enterra's outstanding shares, the Enterra board would be required under
the Williams Act to make certain disclosures to shareholders. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d),
78n(d) & (e) (1982) (Williams Act); infra note 122 (discussing directors' duties under Williams
Act).
96. 600 F. Supp. at 691.
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agreement.97 Having rejected SGS' duty to convey theory, the court concluded
that the movants had not satisfied the requirements for sustaining the grant
of a preliminary injunction and accordingly denied the motion.98 Importantly,
the Enterra court denied the motion fearing that granting the injunction
would cast doubt on the validity of standstill agreements and thus create
uncertainty between corporations and shareholders privy to standstill agree-
ments as well as disrupt trading markets listing those corporations' shares."
The Enterra board's execution of a standstill agreement in Enterra
typifies an issuer's use of a standstill agreement to respond to an investor's
significant accumulation of the issuer's stock.' °° The accumulation of a
significant number of the issuer's shares in the hands of a single investing
entity presents a threat to the issuer because the investor may use the
substantial investment as leverage for a takeover.°'0 The issuer's execution
of a standstill agreement with the investor, which limits the investor's
ownership interest in the issuer, reduces the possibility of a takeover and
thus promotes a stable relationship between the issuer and the investor.,, 2
From an investor's perspective, however, the execution of a standstill agree-
ment may permit the investor to acquire shares in the issuer up to the
negotiated limit at a lower price than would be attainable absent a standstill
agreement. 03 An investor's significant accumulations of an issuer's shares
may drive up the price of the stock because the significant purchases may
create public speculation in the trading market for the issuer's stock that a
takeover of the issuer is impending.' °4 The execution of a standstill agreement,
97. Id.
98. Id. at 692; see supra note 70 (movant must demonstrate both likelihood of success on
merits and irreparable harm to obtain preliminary injunction).
99. See 600 F. Supp. at 692.
100. See id. at 681-82 (Enterra and SGS executed standstill agreement in response to SGS'
significant accumulation of Enterra common stock); FLEISCHER, supra note 4, at 115-119 (issuer
may execute standstill agreement once investor has accumulated substantial number of shares
in issuer); supra note 4 (considering standstill agreements arising in context of investor's
significant accumulation of issuer's stock through open market and negotiated purchases).
101. See LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 1, § 1.04[4][a] at 1-25 (investor may effectuate
takeover by purchasing large block of stock in issuer). An investor accumulating an issuer's
stock as a first step toward the acquisition of the issuer typically acquires the stock through
negotiated purchases with a third party or through open market purchases. See id.; FLEISCHER,
supra note 4, at 112-13; Nathan, supra note 4, at 343. Once an investor has acquired a
substantial equity position in an issuer, the investor's complete acquisition of the issuer often
follows. LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 1, § 1.04[a] at 1-26.
102. See Bartlett & Andrews, supra note 3, at 146 (in executing standstill agreement issuer
may wish to avoid control battle with contracting shareholder); Nathan, supra note 4, at 354
(limiting investor's holdings in issuer prevents investor from obtaining working control of
issuer); Enterra, 600 F. Supp. at 687 (recognizing usefulness of standstill agreement to avert
control battle with investor and promote stability in relationship with investor).
103. See infra notes 105 & 106 and accompanying text (execution of standstill agreement
often causes market price of issuer's stock to decrease, thereby enabling investor to purchase
issuer's stock at lower price).
104. See Enterra, 600 F. Supp. at 687 (dictum); Plaintiff's Brief, supra note 57, at 29-30
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however, may quell any public speculation that a takeover of the issuer is
imminent, thus stabilizing or decreasing the market price of the issuer's stock
and thereby enabling the investor to acquire additional although a limited
number of shares in the issuer at a lower praise than would be attainable
absent the standstill agreement. 05
In Enterra, SGS executed the standstill agreement with Enterra to acquire
at a favorable price additional shares in Enterra, purportedly for investment
purposes.'0 6 Despite the existence of the standstill agreement, SGS nonetheless
attempted to acquire Enterra, maintaining that the Enterra board had a duty
to communicate to Enterra shareholders the terms of any SGS offer. 0 7 The
effect of SGS' attempt to circumvent the prohibitions of the standstill
agreement was to test judicially the validity of an issuer's use of a standstill
agreement to prevent an investor's creeping or toe-hold acquisition. 03 In
rejecting the duty to convey theory that SGS advanced to effectuate the
acquisition of Enterra, the Enterra court validated the use of standstill
agreements as an appropriate technique which an issuer's board of directors
may utilize to avert a control battle with a major investor.'09 Certainly after
Enterra, an investor accumulating shares as a toe-hold for a future acquisition
of the issuer should not submit to a long term standstill agreement because
standstill agreements have the effect of eliminating the leverage for an
acquisition that an investor would otherwise obtain from acquiring a minority
interest."10 Indeed, in light of Enterra, the willingness of an investor to accede
(noting that SGS member's purchase of 4.6% of Enterra common stock caused increase in
trading activity and increase in price of Enterra common stock); see also Jensen and Ruback,
The Market For Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 8-15 (1983).
An increase in a target corporation's stock price often will occur before the first public
announcement of a takeover. See id. at 10. Empirical studies indicate that successful takeovers
generally result in a significant increase in the price of the target's stock. See id. at 10-14.
Unsuccessful takeovers also generally reflect an increase in the price of the target's stock at
least up through the period immediately following the unsuccessful takeover. Id. at 14-16.
105. See Dann & DeAngelo, Standstill Agreements, Privately Negotiated Stock Repur-
chases, and the Market for Corporate Control, 11 J. FIN. EcoN. 275, 299 (1983) (concluding
that standstill agreements reduce price of issuer's stock); see infra note 118 (discussing Dann &
DeAngelo study in relation to negative effect of standstill agreements on wealth of nonpartici-
pating stockholders).
106. Enterra, 600 F. Supp. at 682.
107. See id. at 682-83; see also supra notes 49-59 and accompanying text (discussing SGS'
attempt to acquire Enterra through $21 per share proposal).
108. See 600 F. Supp. at 684 (Enterra court's statement of issue in Enterra).
109. See id. at 688, 692 (Enterra court's conclusion that standstill agreements are valid and
enforceable contracts).
110. See id.; Nathan, supra note 4, at 368 (practical effect of standstill agreement is to
eliminate leverage for acquisition of issuer which investor would otherwise secure through
investor's minority investment). An investor acquiring a minority interest in an issuing corpo-
ration as a means of gaining a toe-hold for a future acquisition of the issuer generally will not
accept a long-term standstill agreement contemplating a term of 5 to 10 years. See Nathan,
supra note 4, at 366; see also LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 1, § 1.04[4] at 1-25 (discussing
investor's purchase of block of issuer's stock as takeover approach).
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to a long-term standstill agreement should establish dispositively the inten-
tions of the investor."'
For an investor primarily seeking to reap the profits of purchasing a
large block of stock in a strong company whose stock is undervalued, the
execution of a standstill agreement may facilitate this goal. ' 2 Nevertheless,
in negotiating a standstill agreement with the issuer, the investor should
bargain for a standstill agreement that provides the investor with input into
a variety of the issuer's significant corporate actions affecting the investor's
minority interest. 3 In particular, an investor should demand voting rights
with respect to shares held under the standstill agreement." 4 In addition, the
investor should insist upon including in the standstill agreement provisions
which permit the investor an escape from the agreement upon the occurence
of certain events adversely affecting the investor's interest.' A standstill
agreement that provides the investor with input into corporate decisions
important to the investor and permits the investor an escape from the
111. See supranote 110 and accompanying text (investor seeking toe-hold for acquisition
will not execute long-term standstill agreement).
112. See supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text (execution of standstill agreement
causes market price of issuer's stock to decrease, thereby enabling investor to purchase shares
at lower price). An investor acquiring directly or indirectly holdings of at least 20% of an
issuing corporation's outstanding stock may be entitled to use the equity method of accounting
because the investor is presumed to exercise significant influence over the issuer. See The Equity
Method of Accounting for Investment in Common Stock § .17, 4 AICPA PROF. STANDS. (CCH)
§§ 5131.03, 5131.17, 5131.19 (1974). The equity system of accounting provides an investor with
financial reporting advantages. Bartlett & Andrews, supra note 3, at 145 n.7; see AICPA PROF.
STANDS., supra, at § 5131.19. The existence of a standstill agreement, however, may rebut the
presumption that the investor exercises significant influence over the issuer. Bialkin, supra note
3, at 113 (citing Financial Accounting Standards Bd. Interpretation No. 35, at 6-7 (May 1981)).
Whether the equity method of accounting is appropriate given the existence of a standstill
agreement depends upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the agreement. See
id.
113. See Bartlett & Andrews, supra note 3, at 168-72 (carefully drafted board representation
provisions permitting investor input into corporate decisions may enhance and protect investor's
investment interest); id. at 164-67 (investor should bargain for less restrictive voting provisions,
particularly with respect to voting shares freely on matters of particular importance to investor);
supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text (discussing board representation provisions and
potential problems arising out of investor's direct representation on issuer's board); supra note
25 and accompanying text (arguments and proposals for less restrictive voting provisions in
standstill agreements).
114. See Bartlett & Andrews, supra note 3, at 167 (investor should demand right to vote
freely on certain issues deemed vital to investor); see also Seagram-DuPont Agreement, supra
note 5, at A-82 (prohibiting Seagram from soliciting proxies or becoming participant in
solicitation except with respect to "significant events" which includes variety of events causing
structural change in corporation and matters out of ordinary course of business of corporation);
Note, supra 14, at 1106-08 (proposing solutions to restrictive voting provisions in standstill
agreements); supra note 25 (discussing arguments and proposals for less restrictive voting
provisions in standstill agreements).
115. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text (discussing termination provisions in
standstill agreements and events causing termination).
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agreement in the event of material changes in the structure of the issuer,
benefits the investor as well as the issuer."
6
Although standstill agreements may confer substantial benefits on both
the issuer and the investor, consideration of the market effect that the
execution of a standstill agreement has on the value of the issuer's stock
indicates that standstill agreements reduce the wealth of nonparticipating
shareholders.' '7 The threat of a takeover of an issuer normally elicits a
substantial increase in the market value of the issuer's stock.", Because
standstill agreements reduce the threat of takeover, the execution of a
standstill agreement may cause the short-term price of the issuer's stock to
remain low and thus adversely affect the wealth of nonparticipating share-
holders.1"9 As Enterra suggests, shareholders bringing derivative suits based
on the negative valuation consequences of the execution of a standstill
agreement should be largely unsuccessful because of the deference which
courts accord the business decisions of corporate directors under the business
judgment rule. 20 Provided an issuing corporation's directors can articulate
116. See supra notes 27-38 & 113-117 and accompanying text (provisions commonly
incorporated in standstill agreements providing benefits to investor); see also supra notes 104-
106 and accompanying text (execution of standstill agreement reduces market price of issuer's
stock, thereby enabling investor to purchase stock in issuer at lower price); supra notes 9-23
and accompanying text (provisions in standstill agreements benefiting issuer).
117. See Dann & DeAngelo, supra note 105, at 299. The Dann and DeAngelo study
examined the common stock price impact associated with standstill agreements for a sample of
firms executing standstill agreements during the period 1977-80. See id. at 282-83. The study
tested two competing hypotheses, both of which attempt to explain the effect of standstill
agreements on the wealth of nonparticipating shareholders. See id. at 277. The managerial
entrenchment hypothesis predicted that standstill agreements decrease the wealth of nonparti-
cipating shareholders. Id. at 278. The stockholder interest hypothesis, on the other had, predicted
that standstill agreements increase the wealth of nonparticipating shareholders. Id. at 280. The
empirical results of the Dann and DeAngelo study were consistent with the managerial
entrenchment hypothesis and therefore indicated that standstill agreements reduce the wealth of
nonparticipating shareholders. Id. at 292, 299; see also Jensen & Ruback, supra note 104, at 39
(empirical evidence indicates that directors' opposition which prevents takeover attempts de-
creases wealth of nonparticipating shareholders). The Dann and DeAngelo study attributed the
reduction in nonparticipating shareholders' wealth to managerial inefficiency resulting from the
reduced takeover threat. See id. at 278, 280. However, the reduction of the price of an issuer's
stock following the execution of a standstill agreement also may result from the decrease in
public speculation that a takeover of the issuer is impending. Cf. Jensen & Ruback, supra note
105, at 8-10, 22 (increase in price of target's stock occurs on or before first public announcement
of takeover).
118. See Jensen & Ruback, supra note 104, at 8 (in both successful and unsuccessful tender
offers, target's stock price typically remains substantially above pre-offer level); Enterra, 600
F. Supp. at 687 (dictum) (investor's significant purchases of issuer's stock often will cause price
of issuer's stock to rise); Plaintiff's Brief, supra note 57, at 29-30 (noting that SGS member's
purchase of 4.6% of Enterra common stock caused increase in trading activity and price of
Enterra common stock).
119. See Dann & DeAngelo, supra note 105, at 292, 299 (empirical analysis indicates that
standstill agreements reduce wealth of nonparticipating stockholders); see also supra note 117
(explaining Dann & DeAngelo study).
120. See Enterra, 600 F. Supp. at 688 (quoting Bartlett & Andrews, supra note 3, at 150,
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bona fide corporate objectives for executing a standstill agreement, courts
likely will continue to approve the use of standstill agreements notwithstand-
ing the negative effect which standstill agreements may have on nonpartici-
pating stockholders' wealth.
12 1
While standstill agreements may survive judicial scrutiny despite reducing
the wealth of nonparticipating shareholders, standstill agreements should not
deprive shareholders of the opportunity to tender their shares at a substantial
premium in response to third party tender offers.122 In Biechele v. Cedar
Point, Inc., ,23 the Sixth Circuit, in ruling that a standstill agreement was not
a manipulative device in violation of the federal securities laws, recognized
that the standstill agreement at issue did not interfere with competitive
for conclusion that court should not second-guess directors' decision to execute standstill
agreement for valid corporate purpose if directors have consulted business and legal advisors);
see also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. Supr. Ct. 1984) (business judgment rule
permits presumption that in making business decision directors acted on informed basis, in
good faith, and in the interests of corporation and shareholders); supra note 45 (discussion of
business judgment rule and primary purpose test).
In Enterra, the district court observed that a shareholder cannot bring a derivative suit
requesting injunctive relief based on the diminution in value of the shareholder's stock allegedly
resulting from the board of directors' actions. See 600 F. Supp. at 691-92. Recognizing that a
party seeking injunctive relief must demonstrate irreparable injury, the Enterra court reasoned
that a shareholder seeking injunctive relief based on diminution in the value of the shareholder's
stock would be unable to demonstrate irreparable harm because an action at law is available
for recovery of money damages for financial loss. See id. at 691-92; see also In Re Arthur
Treacher's Franchisee Litigation, 689 F.2d 1137, 1145-46 (3d Cir. 1982) (injunctive relief is
inappropriate when movant claims monetary loss because movant can recoup loss in proper
action at law); Northwest Industries, Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Company, 301 F. Supp. 706, 710-
12 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (refusing to grant injunctive relief to shareholder alleging diminished value
of holdings due to board action on grounds that shareholder had adequate remedy at law).
121. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (courts will uphold directors' defensive
measures having valid corporate purpose); supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text (Enterra
court observed that Enterra board advanced valid corporate purposes for executing standstill
agreement with SGS); see also Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 298-99 (7th Cir.)
(directors may take defensive measures to oppose takeovers which directors believe are detri-
mental to corporation even if at expense of short term interests of shareholders), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
122. See infra notes 123-125 (standstill agreements should allow nonparticipating share-
holders to tender their stock). A tender offer is a public announcement directed to the
shareholders of a corporation expressing the willingness of the offeror to purchase the share-
holders' stock at a specified price. See Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer"
Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HARv. L. Rav. 1250, 1251 (1973). Sections 14(d)
and 14(e) of the Williams Act regulate tender offers. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) & (e); Pub. L. No.
90-439, 82 Stat. 454, 455 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f)
(1981 & Supp. 1985) (Williams Act). Under the Williams Act, no later than 10 business days
from the date of the offer, the directors of a target corporation must respond to the tender
offer by disclosing to the shareholders that the directors either recommend acceptance or
rejection of the offer, express no opinion on the offer, or are unable to take a position on the
offer. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2 (1985). Tender offers typically trigger a substantial increase in the
price of the target corporation's stock. See Jensen & Ruback, supra note 104, at 15.
123. 747 F.2d 209 (6th Cir. 1984).
[Vol. 42:10151038
STANDSTILL AGREEMENTS
bidding by third parties.124 The Biechele court implied that standstill agree-
ments should not inhibit third parties from making tender offers.121 Although
often the purpose and effect of a standstill agreement is to impair or
discourage third party bidders, standstill agreements generally anticipate that
a third party may make a tender offer for a significant block of the issuer's
securities. 2 6
At least one court has suggested that the board of directors of a
corporation should not execute a standstill agreement that has the effect of
depriving the corporation's shareholders of the opportunity to consider tender
offers that the directors may oppose. 27 In Conoco Inc. V. Seagram Co.
Ltd.,,28 the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York considered the enforceability of an oral agreement which contemplated
the execution of a standstill agreement under a "white knight" arrange-
ment. 29 In Conoco, Dome Petroleum Ltd. made a tender offer for Conoco
Inc. (Conoco) which Conoco resisted. 30 Seagram Company, Ltd. (Seagram),
124. See id. at 216 (standstill agreement at issue did not inhibit third party bidders). In
Biechele, Cedar Point, Inc. (Cedar Point) executed a standstill agreement with Pearson and Son
Limited (Pearson) in connection with Pearson's tender offer for up to 15.3%yo of Cedar Point
common stock. Id. at 211. The standstill agreement provided that absent special circumstances,
Pearson would not acquire in excess of 30% of Cedar Point common stock for a period of five
years. Id. In addition to asserting other claims related to the standstill agreement between Cedar
Point and Pearson, the plaintiff-shareholders of Cedar Point asserted that the standstill
agreement was a manipulative device in violation of the federal securities laws. See id. at 211-
12, 215. The plaintiffs maintained that the standstill agreement impeded normal, healthy trading
of Cedar Point's common stock by locking up stock held by Pearson under the standstill
agreement. Id. at 215. In rejecting the plaintiffs' claim that the standstill agreement constituted
an impermissible lock up of Cedar Point stock, the Sixth Circuit emphasized that the standstill
agreement did not inhibit third party tender offers. See id. at 215-16; see also Mobil Corp. v.
Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 374 (6th Cir. 1981)) (ruling that "lock up" arrangement
constitutes manipulative device under federal securities law); Nelson, Mobil Corp. v. Marathon
Oil Co.-The Decision and Its Implications for Future Tender Offers, 7 CoRP. L. REV. 233
(1984) (contending that lock up arrangement in Mobil Corp v. Marathon Oil Co. was both
manipulative under federal securities laws and breach of directors fiduciary duty).
125. See Biechele, 747 F.2d at 216 (standstill agreement was not manipulative under federal
securities laws because agreement only limited contracting shareholder to minority position and
did not inhibit third party bidders).
126. See, e.g., Whittaker-Smith Agreement, supra note 5, at 8 (permitting investor to
tender shares pursuant to third party tender offer provided third party acquires at least 30% of
issuer's voting securities and investor affords issuer right of first refusal before tendering shares);
Enterra-SGS Agreement, supra note 25, at 11-13 (provision setting forth obligations and right
of parties to agreement in event of third party tender offer); City Investing-NVF Letter
Agreement, supra note 5, at 3 (clause providing for investor's release from ownership limitation
if third party makes successful tender offer for greater than 21 % of issuer's stock).
127. See Conco Inc. v. Seagram Co. Ltd., 517 F. Supp. 1299 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); infra notes
130-149 and accompanying text (discussion of Conoco).
128. 517 F. Supp. 1299 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
129. See 517 F. Supp. at 1301-02. See also supra note 4 (parties may execute standstill
agreement in connection with "white knight" arrangement).
130. 517 F. Supp. at 1301.
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acting as a white knight for Conoco, proposed in the' course of negotiations
with Conoco a friendly tender for thirty-five percent of Conoco stock. 3'
Seagram allegedly promised to limit the tender offer to thirty-five percent of
Conoco stock and to refrain from making any further tender offers should
the negotiations fail.a 2 Seagram agreed to subject the proposed acquisition
of thirty-five percent of Conoco stock to a standstill agreement.'33 During
the period of negotiations with Seagram, Conoco, unknown to Seagram,
also was engaged in negotiations with Cities Service Company (Cities Serv-
ice). 3 4 Conoco eventually decided to merge with Cities Service' 3 In response
to Conoco's merger decision, Seagram launched a hostile tender offer for
up to 40 percent of Conoco stock, causing Cities Service to withdraw from
merger negotiations with Conoco.1'6 Conoco then sought a preliminary
injunction to enjoin Seagram's tender offer.137 Subsequently, E.I. duPont de
Nemours & Co. (DuPont) extended an offer to purchase Conoco shares
under terms more favorable to Conoco than the Seagram tender offer.'3s
Seagram responded by escalating its original offer.'3 9 In its amended motion
for a preliminary injunction to enjoin Seagram's tender offer, Conoco
contended that Seagram should be estopped from making any tender offer
on the basis of the oral agreement Seagram made during negotiations.
40
Conoco asserted as an alternative claim that if the court permitted' Seagram
to proceed with the tender offer, the court should require Seagram to hold
acquired stock subject to the terms and restrictions of the standstill agreement
proposed during negotiations."
4
In considering Conoco's motion for a preliminary injunction, the district
court in Conoco rejected Conoco's claims, maintaining that the ultimate
decision whether to accept Seagram's or DuPont's tender offer rested not
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. In Conoco, Seagram agreed to a standstill agreement which would remain in effect
for 15 years. Id. The standstill agreement also would impose voting limitations and transfer
restrictions on Conoco stock held by Seagram under the agreement. See id.; see also supra
notes 14-25 and accompanying text (discussing transfer restriction provisions and voting limi-
tations in standstill agreements).
134. 517 F. Supp. at 1301.
135. Id.
136. Id. The Seagram tender offer in Conoco contemplated an acquisition of up to 400o
of Conoco common stock at a price of $73 per share. Id.
137. Id. at 1300, 1301.
138. Id. In Conoco, DuPont made a tender offer for Conoco common stock pursuant to
a merger agreement with Conoco. Id. at 1300. Under the merger agreement, DuPont was to
purchase 40% of Conoco stock at $87.50 per share and exchange DuPont shares for the
remaining Conoco stock. Id. Conoco also extended DuPont the option of purchasing 15.9
million unissued shares of Conoco stock. Id. Conoco then would merge into a DuPont
subsidiary. Id.
139. In Conoco, following DuPont's tender offer, Seagram amended its original tender
offer of 35 % to approximately 51 % of Conoco stock at $85 per share. Id.




with Conoco's directors but with the corporation's shareholders. 42 The
Conoco court refused to accept Conoco's estoppel claim, observing that
enforcement of Seagram's promise of a limited tender offer subject to the
terms of the standstill agreement would deprive Conoco shareholders of the
opportunity to accept DuPont's offer. 143 The Conoco court added that
although the Conoco directors were free to communicate to the shareholders
their dissatisfaction with the Seagram proposal, the directors were not free
to deny the shareholders the opportunity to pass upon the Seagram offer or
any other offer.1 4
Despite not having addressed the merits of the proposed standstill
agreement, Conoco demonstrates the significance of a board of directors'
timing of the execution of a standstill agreement . 45 As Conoco suggests,
standstill agreements executed in response to or anticipating tender offers
may deprive shareholders of the opportunity to exercise their own judgment
in deciding whether to tender shares when faced with an offer. 146 A board
of directors responding to a hostile tender offer by executing a standstill
agreement should be prepared to advance a proper corporate purpose for
the standstill agreement because the impression likely to be created is that
the undertaking served primarily to perpetuate the director's control. 47 In
142. See id. at 1303. The district court in Conoco recognized that Conoco, favoring the
DuPont offer, sought to limit the Conoco stockholders to the DuPont offer by restraining the
Seagram offer through an injunction. See id. at 1303. To this end, Conoco asserted that
Seagram should be estopped from making any tender offer to Conoco shareholders based on
Seagram's promise during negotiations that Seagram would make only a limited tender offer
subject to the terms of a standstill agreement. See id. at 1300, 1301.
143. See id. at 1303. The Conoco court stated that the directors of a corporation owe a
duty to exercise their best judgment in evaluating proposals such as tender offers. Id. The court
maintained, however, that the directors judgment is not binding upon the shareholders. Id. The
Conoco court insisted that shareholders, once informed of the facts, maintain the right to
accept an outstanding tender offer for their stock. Id.
144. See id. at 1303-04 (directors should not deprive shareholders of opportunity to accept
offer); see also Armour & Co. v. General Host Corp., 296 F. Supp. 470, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)
(when faced with competing offers, decision whether to accept one offer over another or reject
both rests with each individual stock-holder); American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American
Sugar Co., 276 F. Supp. 45, 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (same).
145. See infra notes 147-149 and accompanying text (standstill agreements executed in
response to tender offers may infringe upon shareholders' right to tender their shares).
146. See 517 F. Supp. at 1302-03. In an effort to thwart an unwanted tender offer, the
directors of a corporation may utilize a standstill agreement in connection with a "white knight"
arrangement. See LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 1, § 6.04[4] at 6-51. The investor acting
as a "white knight" may acquire the issuer's stock through a direct purchase of issuer's
authorized but unissued stock or by making a competing tender offer at a higher price. See id.
(direct purchase); 517 F. Supp. at 1301 (competing tender offer). The parties may then agree
to subject the investor's acquisition to a standstill agreement. See 517 F. Supp. at 1301, 1302
(Seagram would acquire 35% of Conoco stock through tender offer and then subject that
acquisition to terms and restrictions of standstill agreement); see also supra note 4 (parties may
execute standstill agreement in context of white knight arrangement).
147. See Treadway Companies, Inc. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382-83 (2d Cir. 1980)
(stock transactions affecting corporate control necessarily raise inference that directors had self
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sum, Conoco favors the position that courts should not permit corporate
directors, when anticipating or in the midst of a tender offer, to utilize
defensive tactics such as standstill agreements which have the effect of
preempting the shareholders' decision to tender their stock.'
48
Thus, while the Enterra ruling endorses the use of standstill agreements,
Conoco illustrates the potential problems with executing a standstill agree-
ment after the issuing corporation has become the subject of a tender offer.'
49
interest in transaction and therefore directors must show proper corporate purpose for trans-
action); Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp., 511 F. Supp 294, 305 (D. Del. 1981) (with respect to stock
purchase in context of tender offer, directors have inherent conflict of interest and therefore
must bear burden of justifying transaction); Northwest Industries, Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich
Company, 301 F. Supp. 706 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (directors may be accused of attempting to retain
their positions at expense of shareholders whenever directors resist tender offers, but neverthe-
less, directors must oppose offers which directors believe are detrimental to corporation and
shareholders); see also supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussion of business judgment
rule and primary purpose test).
148. See 517 F. Supp. at 1303-04; see also Note, Developments in Corporate Takeover
Techniques: Creeping Tender Offers, Lockup Arrangements, and Standstill Agreements, 39
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1095, 1120-21 (1982) (Conoco represents policy determination that
corporate directors should not be permitted to contract away shareholders' right to consider
tender offers). Considerable debate exists concerning the proper role of corporate directors in
responding to tender offers. Courts, applying the business judgment rule, generally have upheld
the use of defensive measures by corporate directors to resist unwanted tender offers. See, e.g.,
Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757, 759-60 (2d Cir.) (upholding director sale of
treasury stock to one of two competing bidders in effort to thwart unsatisfactory offer), cert.
denied, 104 S.Ct. 271 (1983). Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 293-299 (7th Cir.)
(approving directors' defensive stock aquisitions exercised to resist takeover), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1092 (1981); Treadway Companies, Inc. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382-84 (2d Cir.
1980) (upholding directors' sale of stock to white knight); see also supra note 45 (discussion of
business judgment rule and primary purpose test). Commentators, however, have expressed
criticism and disapproval of the courts' present application of the business judgment rule to
defensive actions that corporate directors may undertake to resist hostile tender offers. See
Steinberg, Some Thoughts on Regulation of Tender Offers, 43 MD. L. REv. 240, 241-50 (1984)
(disapproving of courts' application of business judgment when directors' defensive tactics
preclude shareholders from tendering their stock in response to tender offer); Easterbrook &
Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management In Responding to a Tender Offer, 94
HAiv. L. REv. 1161 (1981) (arguing that because directors' resistance to tender offers ultimately
decreases shareholder welfare, directors should exercise managerial passivity in responding to
tender offers); Note, Tender Offer Defensive Tactics and the Business Judgment Rule, 58
N.Y.U.L. Rav. 621 (1983) (proposing less deferential version of business judgment rule which
considers directors' inevitable self interest in resisting takeovers); but see Lipton, Takeover Bids
in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101, 130-31 (1979) (maintaining that directors'
resistance to tender offers improves shareholders welfare and that courts should apply business
judgment rule to directors' defensive actions in same manner as courts apply rule to directors'
other major business decisions). See also Note, supra note 14, at 1109-I1 (proposing that courts
reverse good faith presumption of business judgment rule when directors execute standstill
agreement containing restrictive voting provisions).
149. See supra notes 79-90 and accompanying text (Enterra court's approval of use of
standstill agreements); supra notes 130-149 and accompanying text (directors' use of standstill
agreements in context of resisting hostile tender offer may deprive shareholders of opportunity
to accept or refuse third party offers).
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Once executed, however, standstill agreements governing an investor's mi-
nority interest may confer benefits on both the issuer and the investor.5 0
Nonetheless, standstill agreements may reduce the wealth of nonparticipating
shareholders.' As long as courts continue to apply the business judgment
rule in considering corporate directors' defensive actions, standstill agree-
ments, regardless of when executed, should continue to survive judicial
scrutiny provided a valid corporate purpose exists for executing the agree-
ment. 112
PETER J. WALSH, JR.
150. See supra notes 26-40 and accompanying text (provisions commonly incorporated in
standstill agreements potentially benefiting investor); supra notes 113-117 and accompanying
text (standstill agreements permit investor to acquire issuer's stock at reduced price); supra
notes 9-23 and accompanying text (provisions in standstill agreements benefiting issuer).
151. See supra notes 118-120 and accompanying text (standstill agreements reduce wealth
of nonparticipating shareholders).
152. See supra notes 45 & 70-83 and accompanying text (business judgment rule protects
directors' business decisions exercised in good faith).
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